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SUFFERING AND THE WILL OF GOD
John T. Edelman

Talk of human suffering as the will of God is often taken to be either confused
or corrupt. This paper suggests that it need be neither. The paper considers
different senses in which suffering might be said to be the will of God and
different objections to such talk. But the primary objective of the paper is to
suggest a conception of suffering as grace, such that it will be intelligible to
pray that suffering come to oneself (Juliana of Norwich) and intelligible to
view as grace the suffering that comes to those one loves (Simone Weil and
Francis de Sales).

I want to consider the idea that a person's suffering might be the will of God.
It seems that to many this idea is obnoxious, either because they think it
confused or because they think it corrupt or because they think it both. But
I do not see that it must be any of these, as though one who said that a given
instance of suffering were God's will were necessarily guilty of either bad
logic or bad morals.
It may be useful to distinguish at the start between what might be called a
"weak" sense and what might be called a "strong" sense in which a person's
suffering could be said to be the will of God.
In the Gorgias, Socrates claims that it is worse to do than to suffer injustice.
That one's circumstances can sometimes be such as to limit one to a choice
between the doing or the suffering of injustice is something Plato makes clear,
I think, in the Crito. If such circumstances can arise, then just as Socrates
says it is better to suffer than to do injustice, so a religious person might say
that it is God's will that he suffer rather than do injustice. I am not concerned
to demonstrate that such circumstances can arise, though I think that often
enough they do. But even if it were agreed that Socrates is correct, and even
if one were to translate Socrates' remark into the claim that it is God's will
that one suffer the injustice rather than avoid it by doing injustice, still, the
relation between the suffering and the will of God would be what I should
call accidental. God, it might be said, does not will the suffering, but only
the acceptance of it. Here is what I mean by a "weak" sense in which a
person's suffering might be said to be the will of God. Virtue may require
that one forego certain means of escape from suffering or even that one
embrace certain sufferings as ethically unavoidable. But the suffering here
can be called a misfortune-in God's eyes as well as in the eyes of the
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sufferer. God, like the sufferer, we might say, wills the suffering only because,
in a sense, it cannot be avoided.
My interest is in a stronger sense in which suffering might be said to be
the will of God-a sense according to which a person's suffering itself, and
not merely the refusal to do injustice, is God's will. One might speak of this
as a sense in which the suffering and the will of God are not accidentally but
essentially related. But what is surely a very common attitude toward this
sense in which suffering might be said to be God's will is found, I think, in
this passage from an essay in The Journal of General Education entitled
"Teaching Cognitive Moral Development":
We begin with the showing of a film entitled "Hunger in America," a survey
of different groups of people in the United States who are badly undernourished. We see a graphic picture of a government official who says flatly that
poor people are poor (hence undernourished) because they are lazy. We hear
a farmer, whose children stare blankly at the photographer, explain that he's
proud to be poor: God made him poor, and that's good enough for him. We
view case after case of people oversimplifying the problem of malnutrition.
Both those who are hungry and those charged with helping them make sweepingly simplistic statements. I stop the film frequently and ask the students to
examine the logic of, for example, the farmer's statement "God made me
poor, and I'm proud of it." It does not take long for the class to see dualistic
thinking among the people in the film, and in this case how such thinking is
fostered by their churches.!
It is enough for present purposes to say that by "dualistic thinking" the
author means what he takes to be rather primitive moral thinking, the kind
of thinking exhibited by individuals in the first and most basic of six purported "stages" in the development of ethical thinking. So he takes the
farmer's statement to be inadequate to his own condition, simplistic or perhaps just simple-minded. But when he wants to call attention to the "logic"
of the farmer's statement "God made me poor and I'm proud of it," it is not
clear whether he thinks there is some logical fault to be noted. I cannot see
any blunder of a logical sort in the farmer's remark. But I can well imagine
a kind of moral objection to what he says. One can imagine something akin
to what Rousseau says of Christianity in the eighth chapter of the fourth book
of his Social Contract: "Christianity teaches only servitude and submission ... True Christians are made to be slaves." Or one can imagine something
akin to Marx's complaint against religion as the "opiate of the people. "The
farmer's remark, one might say, just shows how religion-or at least "bad
religion"-encourages an uncalled-for acquiescence in oppression and injustice. Thus, the religious view that a man's poverty might be for him the will
of God is morally objectionable. This kind of religion fosters "false-consciousness," an inadequate grasp of the reality of one's own situation or
condition.
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But, of course, there is another possible objection to the farmer's statement-a more straightforwardly theological objection. I mean the objection
that often generates what philosophers call "the problem of evil": How, it
might be asked, can a good God will suffering? Ought God not to work
instead to alleviate suffering? Thus "the problem of evil": If God is perfectly
good, He must want to abolish evil. If He is all-powerful, He must be able
to abolish evil. But evil exists. Therefore either God is not perfectly good,
or He is not all-powerful. And in either case He is not, then, God.
I have noted, then, two plausible objections to the farmer's statement, while
dismissing the idea of a "logical" objection to it. These could be taken as
objections to the "strong" sense of the idea that a person's suffering is the
will of God. I have characterized one of these as a moral objection, the other
as a theological one. Yet neither seems to me to show that there must be some
confusion or even corruption on the part of one proposing the idea that a
person's suffering is the will of God. If for no other reason, this is because
both objections seem to beg the question. To express moral indignation at a
religious man's willingness to counsel patient acceptance of suffering is to
have already construed that suffering as an evil to be avoided. And to object
that a good God cannot will suffering on the grounds that He cannot or does
not will evil is also to have construed that suffering as an evil to be avoided.
But in one sense the question I mean to be raising is precisely this question
of whether some suffering might not be an evil to be avoided after all. Indeed,
if I suggest that some suffering might be the will of God, then I might as well
be taken as suggesting that some suffering is not evil. So it is no good to
object to the idea that God wills suffering by appealing to reasons grounded
in the assumption that suffering is an evil to be avoided. On the contrary, it
would seem necessary to retreat a step and ask why one resists calling suffering a good. Put differently, why does one resist identifying suffering and
the will of God?
It may well be thought that an answer to this last question is obvious. I do
not will that my children contract cancer, so how can I conceive of a good
God willing such a thing? But not all thinkers have refused to identify suffering and the will of God. In Agamemnon, Aeschylus puts these words into
the mouth of the chorus:
Zeus, who guided men to think,
... has laid it down that wisdom
comes alone in suffering.2

Elsewhere the chorus remarks that "Righteousness so moves that learning
comes only to the sufferers" (1.250). Agamemnon is at least in part the story
of the sins of Agamemnon, and the story of the consequences of those sins.
The wisdom and the learning of which the chorus speaks concern, I think,
the limits of human power. Pride is the failure to recognize those limits. When
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Aeschylus goes on to speak of "Righteousness" shining in the houses of the
poor (1.772) it is plain, I think, that Righteousness shines there because the
poor do not share in the pride that is the downfall of Agamemnon as well as
the downfall of his wife Clytemaestra. It is in failing to understand the limits
of human power that one is liable, in pride and "sinful daring"(see 11. 763770), to bring disaster upon oneself and one's children:
The curse on great daring
shines clear; it wrings atonement
from those high hearts that drive to evil,
from houses blossoming to pride and peril. (Ll. 374-78)

Now if there is some understanding that comes alone through suffering,
then it will be a kind of confusion to look for someone to have this understanding without the suffering. One possibility is this: there is an understanding that consists in the recognition of the limits of human power, and
there is a suffering that necessarily accompanies and often occasions this
understanding, namely, the suffering-the pain-one feels in running up
against those limits. So the understanding and the suffering cannot come one
apart from the other. Nor, of course, could one arrange for them to come to
oneself-or to anyone else, for that matter. This point, I think, is particularly
important; for in it one might see what could be called "the limits of asceticism": Any kind of renunciation or penance or deprivation that one might
arrange for oneself would indeed be just that, arranged for oneself, while the
understanding at issue here is precisely an understanding of the limits to one's
powers of arranging the world or one's own life in the world. I take it that
this is part of what is at issue in the following remarks in Francis de Sales'
Introduction to the Devout Life:
If you wish to know which are the best sorts of abjection, Philothea, I tell

you plainly that the ones most profitable to our soul and most acceptable to
God are those that come to us accidentally or because of our state in life. The
reason is that we have not chosen them ourselves but have accepted them as
sent by God, and his choice is always better than our own. If we were to
choose any form of humiliation, we should prefer the greatest, and those most
contrary to our inclinations are such, provided that they are in keeping with
our vocations. To say it once and for all: our own choice and selection spoil
and lessen nearly all our virtues. 3

Now if, as de Sales puts it elsewhere, "choice takes away the better part
of our merit,"4 and if suffering, including what he calls "abjection," is the
path to a certain wisdom, then in recognizing what I have called the limits
of asceticism, one might recognize a motive to pray for one's own suffering.
Mother Julian of Norwich, for example, prayed for her own suffering. But I
shall return to this.
So might not a man who says he is proud to be poor and that God made him
poor be taken to be saying that he is proud to have been chosen for a certain
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kind of understanding? A given individual might of course mean a host of
different things with such a remark, and he might well be thoroughly confused
in making the remark. But my concern is only to point to a possibility, the
possibility that some suffering is not an evil to be avoided-or even to be merely
accepted. I mean to point to the possibility that suffering can be a grace.
If suffering can be a grace, then it can be seen as a gift from God, in which
case it might be said that God wiIIed that we suffer. And saying this will be
quite different from saying that some suffering is, as I have suggested above,
ethically unavoidable and in that weaker sense "willed by God." But the
suggestion that suffering can be a grace can itself amount to a variety of
things. So, for example, it might mean something akin to "Adversity builds
character." In The Consolation of Philosophy, "Philosophy" says to Boethius:
Remember, too, that all the most happy men are oversensitive. They have
never experienced adversity and so unless everything obeys their slightest
whim they are prostrated by every minor upset, so trifling are the things that
can detract from the complete happiness of a man at the summit of fortune. 5

So we may agree that a certain amount of hard luck or misfortune is
beneficial. But I am after a sense for the expression "Suffering is a grace"
that is by no means identical to "Adversity builds character," at least if the
latter is taken to mean that the value of the adversity or the suffering lies in
the fact that it builds a kind of endurance that may be useful in the future.
For on such an account of the "grace" of suffering it would appear that
without future trials or hardship the suffering-the "preparation"-were idle.
And if the endurance could be found in some other way then the suffering
would be superfluous. Indeed, on such an account it might seem that suffering
would not be a grace at all to one who already possessed whatever it might
take to face life's ups and downs. But what I am concerned with here is the
possibility of a grace that wiIl show itself precisely in the recognition that on
one's own one cannot possess "whatever it takes" to face life's ups and
downs. Here suffering wiIl be seen as a grace without reference to what the
future holds. The suffering will be seen as a grace-a gift-not because it
may prove useful in the future-in which case it also might not be useful-but
because, as one might put it, the suffering brings one into contact with the
truth. Doubtless, talk of "coming into contact with the truth" will seem more
than a little odd to some. But the truth I have in mind here could be said to
concern the contingency of the world, or the contingency of one's own being.
It might be said to concern the finitude of one's human existence and powers.
Such a truth might seem a counter-weight to our own tendency to pride, to
the kind of pride Aeschylus depicts in the Agamemnon. Such a truth might
also open the door to an understanding of the nature of God, or the nature of
God's love for the world. Consider these lines from the first meditation in de
Sales' Introduction to the Devout Life:
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Consider that a certain number of years ago you were not yet in the world
and that your present being was truly nothing. My soul, where were we at
that time? The world had already existed for a long time, but of us there was
as yet nothing ... Humble yourself profoundly before God, and like the psalmist say with all your heart: "Lord, before you I am truly nothing. How were
you mindful of me so as to create me?" Alas, my soul, you were engulfed in
that ancient nothing and you would still be there if God had not drawn you
out of it. What could you have done in that nothingness?6
The suffering that shows me the limits of my own powers may also show
me the role of "grace" in my life. It may show me that my life itself is a
grace, as de Sales wants us to see in this meditation. And in this way it may
show me God's love, God's love for me as a created being, a being that might
not have been.
Now I have not argued that the attitude that sees suffering as grace is the
best or the correct attitude to take in the face of all suffering or, for that
matter, in the face of any suffering. I have only tried to suggest how such an
attitude need not be a sign of confusion. Still, there may be something in such
an attitude that could lead one to call it corrupt. It is this: It is all very well
for a man to view his own suffering as God's will and to call it a grace; but
what of his neighbor's suffering? What of the poor man's children who "stare
blankly" at the television camera? At this point, whatever understanding is
supposed to come through suffering may begin to look less like understanding
and more like the opiate of which Marx speaks, a kind of numbing comfort
that enables one not only to tolerate one's own suffering but to tolerate the
sufferings of others as well. The difficulties here, it seems to me, are many
and great. So, for example, in the passage in de Sales from which I quoted
above there is to be found no talk of "tolerating" even one's own suffering.
On the contrary, in one of his letters to a woman suffering an undisclosed
"illness," far from there being talk of tolerating suffering, he encourages her
to "offer to suffer even more" and to "love and cherish these afflictions as
coming from such a gentle hand"-the hand of God. Yet at the same time
there is the direction that she do all she can to find remedies for her illness. 7
There may seem to be a contradiction here, and I shall return to that possibility below.
The central difficulty with respect to the suffering of others has, I think,
been well put by R. F. Holland. In an essay titled "On the Form of the Problem
of Evil," Holland discusses the possibility that one could see one's suffering
as God's love, and he makes reference to Mother Julian's remark: "But freely
the Lord giveth when he will; and suffer us in woe sometimes. And both is
one love." Holland notes that among the gifts for which Mother Julian prayed
to God was "bodily sickness in youth." He goes on:
Someone who did not find this (prayer) incoherent might still wonder how
far it touched the most difficult aspect of the problem. An attitude possible
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for an exceptional person in suffering is not necessarily adoptable towards
the suffering of another. Could Julian have wished that the serious illness
which was to come to her should go to someone else? Obviously not. s

But consider these remarks by Simone Weil in a letter to her friend Father
Perrin:
Goodbye. I wish you all possible good things except the cross; for I do not
love my neighbor as myself, you particularly, as you have noticed. But Christ
granted to his well-beloved disciple, and probably to all that disciple's spirituallineage, to come to him not through degradation, defilement, and distress,
but in uninterrupted joy, purity, and sweetness. That is why I can allow myself
to wish that even if one day you have the honor of dying a violent death for
Our Lord, it may be with joy and without any anguish; also that only three
of the beatitudes (mites, mundo corde, pacifici) will apply to you. All the
others involve more or less of suffering.
This wish is not due only to the frailty of human friendship. For, with any
human being taken individually, I always find reasons for concluding that
sorrow and misfortune do not suit him, either because he seems too mediocre
for anything so great or, on the contrary, too precious to be destroyed. One
cannot fail more seriously in the second of the two essential commandments. 9

Now the following entry can be found in Wittgenstein's Notebooks of
1914-18:
It is generally assumed that it is evil to want someone else to be unfortunate.

Can this be correct? Can it be worse than to want him to be fortunate?IO

And in the Nicomachean Ethics there is the suggestion that one mark of
the greedy-and as such the unjust-man will be that he desires too many of
those goods of fortune which, when considered unconditionally, are good,
but which are not always good for this or that person. Aristotle goes on:
Though human beings pray for these (goods of fortune) and pursue them,
they are wrong; the right thing is to pray that what is good unconditionally
will also be good for us, but to choose only what is good for us. II

Does all of this introduce the possibility that love for another might involve
the hope that the beloved meet with certain misfortunes? Not quite, I think,
but very nearly.12 Here once more is Francis de Sales:
I am beseeching God, my dear Daughter, to give you this holy patience; and
the only thing that I can ask of him on your behalf is that he may fashion
your heart entirely according to his liking so that he may live and reign there
eternally; that he may fashion it, I say, with a hammer or with a chisel or
with the stroke of a brush: it is for him to do as he wills, don't you agree ... ?
Surely this is the attitude we should take. 13

The attitude is one of willing that God's will be done. And it involves a
recognition that suffering may be the grace through which His will is done.
So that while we do not have here a prayer that someone will suffer, we are
far from any conception of suffering as an evil to be avoided. Even here,
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however, it will be important to remember de Sales' counsel to his correspondent that she seek all available remedies for her suffering. If this seems
paradoxical, it might seem less so when coupled with his suggestion that the
best form of abjection is the form we do not choose. To fail to seek remedies
would be to choose. On the other hand, to seek remedies in a certain spirit
will be to fail to will God's will.
It seems important to acknowledge here that even if someone could pray
such a prayer as de Sales prays and be innocent of both confusion and
corruption, it would not follow that just anyone could do so. At the same
time, if not just anyone can do so, it does not follow that no one can do so.
It is possible that certain ways of talking about suffering-and so, too, certain
ways of praying about suffering-are available only to those who have themselves suffered, or suffered greatly. So that the same talk-or the same
prayer-from the mouths of others will signify either confusion or corruption.
This in turn suggests the possibility that one might have suffered too little to
say or even to understand some things that are nonetheless true about suffering. It is sometimes suggested that only the comfortable can talk of suffering
as a grace, and that if they suffered more themselves they would see that such
talk is in fact a cruel lie. But perhaps it is only for those who have suffered
greatly to see that the "lie" is true.
Certainly it has not been my purpose to demonstrate that it is true. It may
be that the best that many or most of us can do with these matters is to note
what some others have said. No doubt, among the things that others have said
will be prayers. So it is likely to happen that some people, perhaps aware of
their own confusion or unclarity, and perhaps even acknowledging some kind
of corruption on their own part, will nonetheless imitate those who have said
those prayers in the hope that they, too, might learn to pray them without
confusion or corruption. It does not seem to me that such an attempt to learn
must itself be either confused or corrupt, even if it is the attempt of human
beings who in many other respects are both confused and corrupt. On the
other hand, like most learning by imitation, it is likely to be rather messy,
and not always entirely successful.
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